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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

The Right of a Senior Creditor to
Receive Post-Petition Interest from
a Subordinated Creditor's
Distributions:" Did the Rule of
· Explicitness Survive the
Enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code?
Subordination agreements among
creditors who would otherwise be entitled to share equally in a company's
bankruptcy estate are common in financial trans11ctions. For example, a
company may obtain financing by
issuing debentures that are subordinated to other debt securities or other
types of indebtedness. The level of
priority, whether senior or junior, will
directly affect the credit risk, interest rate, and market with respect to
particular debt securities. S ubordination agreements may arise in other
contexts as well, such as when a
debtor experiencing financial difficulties seeks an additional loan. The
new lende! may insist on an agree-
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ment with existing creditors which
provides that their right to payment
will be subordinated to the full payment of the new loan. The existing
creditors may be willing to sign such
an agreement for the purpose of encouraging_ the new lender to provide
the debtor with needed capital. Regardless of the context, however,
parties often rely on the enforceability of subordination agreements
when entering into financial transactions.
Before the enactment ofthe"Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there were no
statutory provisions recognizing or
giving effect to subordination agreements in bankruptcy cases. The
former Bankruptcy Act, which was
in effect from 1898 until the effective date of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, was silent on contractual subordination. Nonetheless, although
subordination agreements by their
terms modified the statutory scheme
of priorities under the old Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy courts relied
on their equitable powers to give
effect to such agreements. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reasoned, "[e]quitable considerations ... require that the concept of equal distribution be applied
only to creditors of equal rank, i.e.,
creditors who are similarly situated.
Creditors who expressly-,agree to
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subordinate their claims against a
debtor and the creditors for whose
benefit the agreement to subordinate
is executed are not similarly situated."1 Reliance on equitable powers to enforce subordination
agreements is no longer necessary
because the Bankruptcy Code, in
section 510(a), expressly provides
for their enforcement.
The Right to Post-Petition Interest
in Bankruptcy Cases
Ap.other rule that is fundamental
to bankruptcy law-both under the
fofmer Act and under today's
Code-is that interest on unsecured
or undersecured Claims stops accruing when a bankruptcy petition is
fileq by an insolvent debtor. 2 This
rul~. which recognizes that the
debtor's delay in repayment during
the bankruptcy case results from
operation of law, prevents creditors
from profiting or suffering a loss in
relation to each other because of the
delay. 3 The only creditors entitled to
recover post-petition interest from
an insolvent debtor's estate are those
whose claims are oversecured by
collateral of a value that exceeds the
allowed amount of their claims.4 The
inability to recover post-petition interest from a debtor's estate could
be significant when a debtor's Chapter 11 case lasts for several years
1

In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402,
408 (2d Cir. 1966).
2 11 u.s.c. § 502(b)(2).
3
See Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329U.S: 156, 163 (1946).
4
See)1 U.S.C. § 506(b).

before confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
It is not surprising that senior
creditors-armed with an enforceable agreement that subordinates the
rights of junior creditors to the full
payment of senior claims:-have attempted to recover post-petitibn interest from distributions that
otherwise would be made to junior
creditors. 5 That is, senior creditors
have argued that, althQugh they were
not entitled. to recover post-petition
interest from the bankruptcy estate
or the debtor, they were entitled to
receive it from junior creditors. They
have argued that such recovery is
consistent with the junior creditors'
agreement to subordinate their right
to repayment until the senior debt
had been paid in full, and full payment of senior debt includes the payment of post-petition int~rest.
The Developm~nt of the Rule of
Explicitness
This argument by senior creditors
was addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re
Time Sales Finance Corp. 6 in 1974,
four years before the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code. The court held
that a junior creditor could agree to
subordinate its claim to .a senior
creditor's demands for post-petition
s See, e.g., Matter ofTime Sales Finance
Corp., 491 F.2d 841 (3rd Cir. 1974); In re
Kingsboro Mortgage Corp., 514 F.2d 400
(2d Cir. 1975); Matter of King Resources
Co., 528 F.2d 789, 791 (10"' Cir. 1976).
6
In re Time Sales Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d
841 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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interest, but that such agreement is
enforceable only if the subordination
agreement is explicit on that issue.

common law doctrine-survived the
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code. As previously noted, unlike
the former Bankruptcy Act, the
If a creditor desires to establish a right Bankruptcy Code provides express
to post-petition interest and a concomitant reduction in the dividends statutory authority for the recognidue to subordinate creditors, the tion and effectiveness of subordinaagreement should clearly' show that tion agreements in bankruptcy cases.
the general rule that interest stops on In particular, section 510(a) of the
the date of the filing of the petition is Code provides that "[a] subordinato be suspended, at least vis-a-vis
tion agreement is enforceable in a
these parties. 7
case under this title to the same exThe Third Circuit then focused on· tent that such agreement i~ enforcethe subordination agreement before able under applicable nonbankit, and concluded that its language ruptcy law."9 But the Code is silent
requiring that senior debt must be regarding the right of a senior! credi"paid ih full" before payment to jun- tor to receive post-petition interest
ior creditors-without any specific from distributions that would othermention of post-petition interest- wise go to junior creditors.
was not sufficient to alert junior
The issue as to whether or not the
creditors that they had agreed to sub- Rule of Explicitness has remained
ordinate their rights to the post-pe- in effect after the enactment of the
tition interest claims of senior Bankruptcy Code was recently excreditors. Accordingly, the court af- amined in a series of three decifirmed the district court's holding sions-two by the Court of Appeals
that the senior creditors were not for the Eleventh Circuit and one by
entitled to receive post-petition in- the Court of Appeals of the State of
terest from distributions that would New York-in In re Southeast Bankotherwise go to subordinated credi- ing Corporation. 10 In this dispute
tors. Other courts in pre-Code cases between senior and junior creditors,
adopted the Third Circuit's ap- both the bankruptcy court 11 and the
proach, which became known as the district court 12 ruled in favor of the
"Rule of Explicitness."8
junior creditors applying the tradiAn interesting question that has tional Rule of Explicitness.
surfaced is whether the Rule of Explicitness-a judge-made federal
9 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).
7

491 F.2d at 844.
See In re King Resources Co., 385 F.
Supp. 1269 (D.Col. 1974), aff'd 528 F.2d
789 (lOth Cir. 1976); In re Kingsboro Mortgage Corp., 379 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), a.ff'd 514 F2d. 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
8

10
See In re Southeast Banking Corp., 156
F. 3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Southeast f');
In re Southeast Banking Corp., 93 N.Y. 2d
178 (N.Y. 1999) C'Southeast If'); In re
Southeast Banking Corp., 179 F.3d 1307
(11th Cir. 1999) ("Southeast Ilf').
11
188 B.R. 452 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).
12 212 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D;Fia1997).
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The Facts
Southeast Banking Corporation
("Southeast") issued $ 60 million in
principal amount of unsecured notes
(the "Senior Notes"). The Chase
Manhattan Bank ("Chase"), is the
indenture trustee under the Senior
Indenture and Gabriel Capital, L.P.
("Gabriel") is the holder of a substantial portion of the Senior Notes.
In addition, under five indentures
(the "Subordinated Indentures"),
Southeast issued in excess of$ 300
million in principal amount of subordinated notes ("the Subordinated
Notes"). Each of the Subordinated
Indentures contains language that
subordinates collection of the Subordinated Notes to the prior payment
"in full" of the Senior Notes. 13 The
Sutiordinated Indentures made no
specific mention of post-petition interest that may accrue on the Senior
Notes, ·or of the indenture trustee's
fees and costs for collecting such
post-petition interest.
13

The five Subordinated Indentures conFour indentures proVIde, m relevant part, that in the event of
any liquidation or bankruptcy of Southeast
"all obligations of [Southeast ] to Holde~
of Senior Indebtedness of [Southeast] shall
be entitled to be paid in full before any pay~ent shall b.e made on account of the prinCipal of or mterest on the [Subordinated]
Notes." One Subordinated Indenture provides, in relevant part, that "upon ... paym~nt or distribution of assets of [Southeast]
... m ban!'mptcy , all principal, premium, if
any, and mterest due or to become due upon
all Senior Indebtedness shall first be paid in
full ... before any payment is made on acco~nt of the principal or, premium, if any,
or mterest on Debentures...." 212 B.R. l\t
690-691.
'
~n si~lar language.

When Southeast file~ a voluntary
bankruptcy petition 4nder Chapter 7
·of the Bankruptcy Code in 1991,
both Chase and the trustee for the
Subordinated Notes filed proofs of
claims as unsecured nonpriority
claims on behalf of the noteholders.
Because Southeast was insolvent
any claims for post-petition interes~
asserted by unsecured creditors
would not be allowable in the banl<ruptcy case. However, Chase and
Gabriel ("Senior Creditors"), relying
on the subordination provisions of
the Subordinated Indentures, commenced a proceedlng to compel the
payment of.post-petition interest on
the Senior Notes, as well as reimbursement for Chase's fees and costs
in connection with the action, from
distributions otherwise payable to
the holders of the Subordinated
Notes ("Junior Creditors") with respect to their claims for principal and
pre-petition interest.
The bankruptcy court, ruling on
motions for summary judgment,
held that the Senior Creditors were
not entitled to recover post-petition
interest, or costs incurred· in attempting to collect post-petition interest,
from any distributions otherwise
payable to the Junior C~editors with
respect to their claims for principal
and pre-petition int~rest on the Subordinated Notes. 14 The district court
affirmed. 15 Both the bankruptcy
court and the district court based
their holdings on the Rule of Explicitness and a finding that the language
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14

15

188 B.R. 45_2 (Bankr, S.D. Fla. 1995).
212 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D. :f.la. 1997).
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of the indentures was not sufficient! y
explicit to make it clear that the Junior Creditors' claims would be subordinated to ·the Senior Creditors'
claims for post-petition interest.
These courts rejected the argument
made by the Senior Creditors that the
enactment of section 510(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code abrogated the Rule
of Explicitness.
Eleventh Circuit Rejects District
Court's Reasoning: Southeast I
In the first of two opinions
("Southeast 1"), the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed
with the district court's analysis. Although it agreed with the finding
below that the language in the indenture agreements requiring "payment
in full" to Senior Creditors without
any specific reference to post-petition interest is not sufficiently precise to satisfy the Rule of
Explicitness, 16 the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Rule of Explicitness did
not survive the enactment of section
510(a) of the Bankruptcy CodeP
That section provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable
"to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law."
The Eleventh Circuit construed the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" in section 51 O(a) to mean "any

relevant federal or state law." 18 The
court noted the absence of any independent federal statute that might
guide the interpretation of subordination ~greements, as well as the
parties' failure to refer to any
non bankruptcy federal common law
on the subject. This absence of federal authority did not surprise the
court because usually the interpretation of private contracts is a state
law matter.
The Eleventh Circuit also noted
that the Rule of Explicitness was a
creature of the broad equitable powers enjoyed by bankruptcy courts
before the Code's enactment. It also
pointed out the contrast between section 51 O(a), which requires enforcement of subordination agreements to
the extent provided in nonbankruptcy law, and section 51 O(c),
which gives the court the power to
subordinate claims based on the doctrine of equitable subordination.
The language of section 510(c) expressly invokes the bankruptcy
courts' historical exercise of their equitable powers to subordinate the
claims of creditors who engaged in
inequitable conduct in favor of the
claims of those creditors who came
to court with clean hands. Section
51 0(c), therefore, powerfully demonstrates that Congress was aware of the
bankruptcy courts' exercise of their
equitable powers in the context of
subordination, and that Congress
knew how to preserve those powers
to the extent it chose to do so. In sharp
contrast to section 5IO(c), however,
section 510(a) includes no such ex-

16

156 F.3d at 1120.
156F.3dat 1127. SeniorCircuitJudge
Fay dissented and supported the view that
section 510(a) did not abolish the Rule of
Explicitness.

[VOL. 32 : 466 2000]

17

18 156 F.3d at 1121, quoting Patterson v.
Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757-759 ( 1992).
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press grant of authority that would
permit the bankruptcy courts to continue enforcing and interpreting subordination agreements in equity.
When compared with Congress' decision to permit the ban,kruptcy courts
to-retain their powers of equitable
subordination in section 510(c), section 510(a)'s command to enforce
subordination agreements according
to the applicable nonbankruptcy law
can only be read as a clear and contemplated break with prior practice.
Accordingly, the plain language of the
text, as well as the provision's structure, supports our conclusion that
Congress, by designating state law to
go:vem the interpretation and enforcement of subordination agreements,
~ithdrew the foundation of equitable
ai.Ithority under with the bankruptcy
courts had developed the Rule of Explicitness.19

As a result, because the Rule of
Explicitness no longer has its support iq federal judge-made equitable
principles, the rule, if it is to continue to exist and be relied upon,
must find its source of authority in
state law. The Eleventh Circuit
turned to the choice of law provisions in the Subordinated Indentures
which provided that New Yotk law
governs the enforcement and interpretation of the contracts. 20 The
court noted that New York courts
have never considered the question
of whether explicit language, is re- .
quired to subordinate a junior
_creditor's claim to a,senior creditor's
claim for post-petition interest. This
absence of state law authority 1s not
1

9J56F.3dat 1122-1123.
/d. at 1125.

20

surprising because this i~sue arises
only in bankruptcy cases and, until
the Eleventh Circuit decision, federaljudge-made equitable principles
were available to invoke the Rule of
Explicitness. Rather than attempting
to predict how New York courts
would resolve this issue, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following
question to the New York State Court
of Appeals: 21
What, if any, language does New York
law require in a subordination agreement to alert a junior creditor to its
assumption of the risk and burden of
the senior creditor's post-petition interest?

Before sendiqg the issue to the
New York Court of Appeals, however, the Eleventh Circuit offered a
few observations, apparently for the
benefit of the New York court. First,
it noted t~at the "paid in full" language in the Subordinated Indentures may sound in absolute terms
and that "Chase's c~aqtcterization of
the phrase as requiring the payment
of interest until the final repayment
of the underlying obligation is a
straightforward one. " 22 However,
the court commented that the phrase
21
The Eleventh Circuit·certified this
question to the New York Court of Appeals
based on N.Y. Rules of Court§ 500.17(a)
(McKinney 1997), which provides: ''Whenever it appears to ... any United States Court
of Appeals ... that determinative questions
of New York law are involved in a cau§e
pending before it for which there is no controlling precedent of the [New York] Court
of Appeals, such court may certify the dispositive questions o(law to the [New York]
Court of Appeals."
22
156 F.3d at 1124.
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i.ndenture agreemen!S include clauses
"paid in full" is ambiguous in ~e
that invoke New York law, as well as
bankruptcy context where "the law
the importance of standardization in
has long been clear that even a seindenture agreements generally, we
nior cniditor often has no claim for
suspect that the courts of New York,
as a practical matter, would be loath
post-petition interest from the debtor
to depart from prior practice and thus
and, therefore, a junior creditor may
radically
reduce the current value of
reasonably expect to recover some
debt held subject to the condition of
repayment from the debtor without
subordination until the senior credibeing held hostage to an often siztor receives 'payment in full.' 26
able claim for the senior creditor's
post-petition interest." 23
As a final message to the New
New York Court of Appeals
York Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Adopts the Rule of Explicitness as
Its Own: Southeast II
Circuit volunteereq that "we wonder" whether the New York courts
In response to the questi~n· .certiwould "disturb" the uniform treat- fied by the Eleventh Circuit, theNew
ment of federal courts on this issue, York Court of Appeals 27 adopfed ~e
particularly in vie:w of ~vidence that Rule of Explicitness as. a principle
the capital markets appear to have ~f interpretation of contracts under
adjusted to the Rule of Explicit- ·New York law. In particular, the
·ness.24 The court noted that the court held that "[i]n accordarice with
American Bar Association's "Model the Rule of Explicitness, New York
Simplified Indenture,"25 in response law would require specific language
to the Rule of Explicitness, includes in a subordination agreement to alert
language that clearly and explicitly a junior creditor to its assumption of
alerts a junior creditor that subordi- the risk and burden of allowing the
nation applies to the senior creditor's payment of a senior creditor's postpost-petition interest. In an apparent petition
.. mteres
.
tdemand"
.· 28
attempt to influence the New York
The New York Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Cir- began its analysis by recognizing the
cuit offered the following advice:
widespread effect that its decision
Given New York's role as the nation's would have on financial agreements.
financial capital and our intuition that
a sizeable proportion of outstanding
[W]e are acutely. cognizant o~ the
practical effect that our answer t~ the
certified question will have ·on a vast
sea of subordination agreements not
before us now in Ii:ve cases or contro-

23Id.
24

Id. at 1124.
See American Bar Association, Model
Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. Law. 741, 769
(1983). ~ee also, In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc. 134 B.R. 528, 535 n. 14 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991), quoting an indenture with
similarly explicit language to satisfy the Rule
of Explicitness.
2!1

26

Id. at 1125.
In re Southeast Banking Corporation,
93 N.Y. 2d 178 (N.Y.I999)("Southeastll'').
28 Id. at 186.
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versies, nor even within the framework of this Eleventh Circuit litigation, involving enormohs sums of
outstanding public debt. Indeed, while
it is not our forum's role to rule ultimately on the subordination agreements at issue in this case, we
recognize that they and marty others
were drafted and entered into before
the Rule of Explicitness was called
into question by the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit in the instant case. 29

allowed to recover post-petition interest from a subordinated creditor,
a senior creditor could end up receiving more recovery than it would
have been entitled to against the
debtor~ while the subordinated
creditor's recovery is proportionately diminished."32 Such a result
should not be permitted in the absence of clear, explicit language providing for it in the subordination
The Court of Appeals did not treat agreement. This policy basis for the
the practical effect of a decision on Rule of Explicitness did not change
this question lightly. Noting that par- in 1978 because the general rule reties in subordination agreements quiring disallowance of post-petition
undQI}btedly relied on the Rule of interest i'n bankruptcy cases continExpliCitness-"their lawyers would ued under the Code: 33
have ,peen quite remiss had they
Finally, the· New York Court of
not" 30-the New York Court of Ap- Appeals reasoned that the adoption
peals _wrote that the practical policy of the Rule of Explicitness as state
c<;msequence is a matter oflegitimate common law would be consistent
concern in the development of com- with its ruling in another case where
mon hiw with respect to commercial it held that, as a general rule, a credimatters, ~here "reliance, definit~ tor is not entitled to interest that acness, arid predictability are such im- crues following an assignment for
portant goals of'the law itself."31
the benefit of creditors under the
The practical realities aside, the New York Debtor and Creditor Law.
Court of Appeals also found the Rule In Matter of Pavone Textile Corp. v.
of Explicitness to be grounded on Bloom, 34 the Court of Appeals held
sound and relevant policies. Focus- that "the general rule as to post-asing on the mischief that the rule was signment interest prevails in the abdesigned to remedy, the court noted sence of any statute expressly
that it evolved as an equitable prin- providing for such interest. " 35 In
ciple to rectify the perceived ineq- Southeast Banking, the New York
uity that resulted when a junior Court of Appeals referred to its decreditor's potential distributions cision in Pavone Textile and comfrom a bankruptcy estate were taken mented that "the Rule of
to pay a senior creditor's post-petition interest. "If a senio~ creditor is
32

29Jd. at 183-184.
Jd. at 184.

30
31

/d. at 184.

/d. at 185.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
302 N.Y. 206, aff'd. 342 U.S. 912
(1951).
35 Id. at 213.
33
34
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Explicitness safeguards reliance by
parties on the analogous general rule
that creditors are not entitled to postpetition interest in bankruptcy proceedings absent express language to
that effect in subordination agreements ordering priorities among the
contracting parties. ''36

[VOL. 32: 466 2000]

able. In this case, we determined that
the applicable nonbankruptcy law is
the law of New York.... We apply the
Rule of Explicitness here because
New York law, not the Bankruptcy
Code, requires us to do so. 38

Conclusion

The series of decisions in Southeast Banking is instructive for senior
and junior creditors and their lawBased on the law of the State of yers. Parties can no longer rely on
New York as enunciated in the opin- the Rule of Explicitness unless it is
ion of the New York Court of Ap- adopted as state law. Fortunately,
peals, the Eleventh Circuit applied many indentures and other fiQ~nc
the Rule of Explicitness· in uphold- ing agreements with subordination
ing the district court's oecision de- provisions contain choice of' law
nying the request of the Senior clauses providing that they sha:_II be
Creditors to receive post-petition governed by New York hiw. For
interest from distributions otherwise those, the Rule of Explicitne'ss, will
payable to Junior Creditors. 37 But continue to govern questions regardthe Eleventh Circuit further clarified ing the subordination of junior
its decision by noting in a footnote claims to post-petition interest
claims of senior claims, and general
that
language providing for payment in
[T]he district court opinion was in- full of senior claims before junior
correct in concluding that under bank- claims receive any payment will not
ruptcy law, the Rule of Explicitness
survives the enactment of section be sufficient for that purpose.
For subordination agreements not
51 O(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Rather, we must look to the "appli- governed by New York law, whether
cable nonbankruptcy" law to deter- the Rule of Explicitness will apply
mine the extent to which a will depend on the development and
subordination agreement is enforceapplication of state law.

Back to the Eleventh Circuit:
Southeast III

'")•

36
37

93 N.Y.2d at 186.
179 F. 3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).

38
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ld. at 1311 n.2.

